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ABSTRACT
We propose a blind quantum search protocol based on quantum homomorphic encryption, in which a client Alice with limited
quantum ability can give her encrypted data to a powerful but untrusted quantum server and let the server search for her
without decryption. By outsourcing the interactive key update process to a trusted key center, Alice only needs to encrypt
her original data and decrypt the ciphered search result in linear time, and perfectly conceals the underlying plaintext from
the search server as well. Besides, we also present a compact and secure quantum homomorphic evaluation protocol for
Clifford circuits, where all possible keys are updated in parallel by the evaluator, and another server who would not contact the
evaluator then searches out the true decryption key. In contrast with the CL scheme proposed by Broadbent, such protocol
does not need any help from classical homomorphic encryption to achieve compactness.
Please note: Abbreviations should be introduced at the first mention in the main text – no abbreviations lists. Suggested
structure of main text (not enforced) is provided below.
Introduction
Due to the great challenge of building large-scale quantum computers, it is very likely that only a few powerful quantum
computers are initially available and act as quantum servers. Suppose Alice has some confidential data and wishes to search on
them with the aid of a remote quantum server Bob but is unwilling to reveal the data to Bob. A natural approach to achieving
this for Alice is to encrypt her data before handing them over and to let Bob blindly search on the encrypted data.
There has been a great deal of work on the classical counterpart of this issue, and mainly two approaches have been adopted:
devising a special encryption and decryption scheme supporting search functionality, or utilizing a pre-built searchable encrypted
index offered by the client, both of which rely on some cryptographic hardness assumptions and provide computational security
rather than information-theoretic security.1 In the quantum context, Sun2 proposed a quantum symmetric searchable encryption
scheme for classical inputs, in which encryption and decryption are rotations along a coordinate axis, and the secret key is
composed of some random rotation angles. The search procedure of such a scheme is to check and compare the encrypted items
linearly, which is inefficient for a large search space. To accelerate the search process, we combine the Grover’s algorithm3
with a special quantum encryption scheme, i.e. quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE), whose cipher states can be operated
directly without decryption, and give a new kind of quantum search scheme. The effectiveness of this scheme is verified by
classical simulation using MATLAB.
The idea of QHE was first developed by Liang4, who observed the commutation rules between the encryption transform of
quantum one-time pad (QOTP)5 and a universal set of quantum gates (including single-qubit and CNOT gates) and proposed a
symmetric one-party quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme in which homomorphic evaluations require the secret
key. Two years later, he came up with an interactive two-party scheme based on commutation rules for another universal
gate set (consisting of H, S, CNOT and T gates).6 Aside from QHE, the conjunction of QOTP and commutation rules is also
adopted by other closely related quantum cryptographic constructions, such as secure assisted quantum computation,7 quantum
computing on encrypted data8 and delegating private quantum computations.9 These constructions could be considered to be
some embryonic versions of QHE.
Yu et al.10 investigated and sought out a tradeoff between security and efficiency in QHE and concluded that “quantum
mechanics does not allow for efficient information-theoretically-secure fully homomorphic encryption scheme”. In view of
this result, Broadbent and Jeffery devised two kinds of ingenious T gadgets for non-Clifford circuits and presented three
quantum homomorphic schemes based on classical q-IND-CPA secure homomorphic encryption (HE), one of which is designed
for Clifford circuits and the other two are for non-Clifford circuits with a limited number of T gates. These three schemes
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are efficient (or compact, i.e. the decryption complexity is independent of the circuit size) and q-IND-CPA secure (not
information-theoretically secure).11 Subsequently, Dulek and Schaffner proposed a QHE scheme for polynomial-sized T
gates utilizing another kind of ingenious T gadget.12 It should be noted that introducing classical HE (combining with some
sophisticated techniques) into QHE is double edged: it not only makes these new schemes get rid of frequent interactions
and become compact (or quasi-compact) but also leads them to compromising their security and applying to fewer kinds of
evaluations. These hybrid QHE schemes cannot reach perfect security as many pure quantum cryptosystems do, and they
become inefficient for circuits with a large numbers of T gates (e.g., the circuit of Grover’s search).
Apart from the foregoing QHEs based on classical HE and QOTP, a quantum homomorphic scheme utilizing other
techniques is also explored.13 However, this proposal is not applicable to universal circuits and not feasible for our goal.
In consideration of the sub-exponential number of iterations in Grover’s search, where each Grover iteration contains some
T gates, we need to fall back on the early QHE schemes with interactions6, 8, 9 rather than non-interactive ones based on classical
HE,11, 12 since the latter cannot sustain so many T gates. As for Clifford circuits without any T gate, their homomorphic
evaluations become much easier since the Clifford gates can be applied on a cipher state without causing any undesirable error.
For these two different situations, we provide two thin-client protocols with perfect security. A main distinction between them
lies in the different treatment on the key update process, which is an important part of QOTP-based QHE.
Key update in quantum homomorphic encryption based on quantum one-time pad
A QHE scheme is mainly comprised of four components: key generation, encryption, decryption and homomorphic evaluation.
In a QOTP-based QHE scheme, quantum states are encrypted or decrypted with QOTP, which transforms the input state qubit
by qubit with Pauli operators {X , Z} depending on a classical encryption key ek = (x0,z0). In Addition, the homomorphic
evaluation for a Clifford gate in such a scheme is only applying that gate directly on an encrypted state, whereas the homomorphic
evaluation for a non-Clifford gate (the T gate) has to be implemented by a special gadget (the T gadget). Additionally, the
decryption key for ek needs to be refreshed synchronously with respect to the homomorphic evaluation.
For the sake of clarity, we rephrase the key update rules for arbitrary unitary transforms and quantum measurements in
Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively, and list the frequently used variables and abbreviations in Table 1. Note that different QOTP-
based QHE schemes have similar key update rules, and a representative collection of rules together with the corresponding
homomorphic circuits can be referred to Fisher,8 which is adopted in our scheme.
Variables and notations Explanations
N,N+ N= {0,1,2,3, . . .} is a set of non-negative integers, and N+ = {1,2,3,4, . . .} is a set of
positive integers.
M,m,n(m,n ∈ N+) M = 2m is the number of items to be searched, and each item data( j) contains data of n
bits, where j ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,M−1}.
ek,dk,sk ek and dk are 2n-bit encryption and n-bit decryption keys, respectively, for Alice’s data;
dk is encrypted with sk before being transmitted to Alice in Protocol 1.
xr(k),zr(k)(r,k ∈ N) (xr,zr) (r > 0) is the 2n-bit intermediate key of the rth round in the key update algorithm;
x0 and z0 constitute ek; xr(k) is the kth bit of xr and zr(k) is the kth bit of zr.
Xi,Yi,Zi,Hi,Si,Ti
CNOTi,l
Xi,Yi,Zi,Hi,Si or Ti denotes applying a X ,Y,Z,H,S or T gate on the ith qubit of the input
state and letting the other qubits unchanged; CNOTi,l denotes performing a CNOT gate
on the ith and lth qubits of the input, which act as the control and target qubits, respectively.
Note that S and T gates are called P and R gates in Ref. 8.
Table 1. Explanations for frequently used variables and notations.
Algorithm 1 (Key update for unitary transforms). Suppose |ψ〉 is an n-qubit quantum state, V is an n-qubit unitary transform
composed of gates from the universal gate set G = {I,X ,Y,Z,H,S,CNOT,T}, and G is a two-level unitary transform that
merely performs one gate from G on two or fewer qubits. Let ek = (x0,z0) be an encryption key and dkr = (xr,zr)(r ∈ N+)
be the decryption key for V and ek, i.e. V (⊗nk=1Zz0(k)Xx0(k)) |ψ〉 = (⊗nk=1Zzr(k)Xxr(k))V |ψ〉; the updated decryption key
dkr+1 = (xr+1,zr+1) for G·V and ek satisfying G·V (⊗nk=1Zz0(k)Xx0(k)) |ψ〉 = (⊗nk=1Zzr+1(k)Xxr+1(k))G·V |ψ〉 is calculated as
follows:
• If G= I,Xi,Yi,or Zi, then dkr+1 = dkr.
• If G= Hi, then
(xr+1(i),zr+1(i)) = (zr(i),xr(i));
(xr+1(k),zr+1(k)) = (xr(k),zr(k)) (k 6= i).
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• If G= Si, then
(xr+1(i),zr+1(i)) = (xr(i),xr(i)⊕ zr(i));
(xr+1(k),zr+1(k)) = (xr(k),zr(k)) (k 6= i).
• If G= CNOTi,l , then
(xr+1(i),zr+1(i)) = (xr(i),zr(i)⊕ zr(l));
(xr+1(l),zr+1(l)) = (xr(i)⊕ xr(l),zr(l));
(xr+1(k),zr+1(k)) = (xr(k),zr(k)) (k 6= i,k 6= l).
• If G= Ti (suppose the secret bits Alice chooses for this T gate are yˆ and dˆ, and the related one-bit measurement result
from the server is cˆ), then
(xr+1(i),zr+1(i)) = [xr(i)⊕ cˆ,xr(i)·(cˆ⊕ yˆ⊕1)⊕ zr(i)⊕ dˆ⊕ yˆ];
(xr+1(k),zr+1(k)) = (xr(k),zr(k)) (k 6= i).
Algorithm 2 (Key update for quantum measurements). Let |ψ˜〉= (⊗nk=1Zzr(k)Xxr(k)) |ψ〉 be an n-qubit cipher state under key
dkr = (xr,zr)(r ∈ N+) and M be a computational basis measurement. The updated decryption key dkr+1 for the classical
measurement outcomeM |ψ˜〉 ≡ ψ˜M satisfying ψ˜M ⊕dkr+1 = ψM is dkr+1 = xr, where ψM is the underlying plaintext of
ψ˜M .
It follows from the above that for a given unitary transform U , the final decryption key dk for the homomorphic evaluation
of U depends on the initial encryption key ek, the concrete circuit CU of U , the secret parameters (y,d) chosen by Alice for all
T gates in CU and the measurement result c corresponding to these T gates from the server. During a homomorphic execution
of CU , the server can regard c as a known part of the related key update process. Hence, by the view of the server, there is a
unitary decryption-key-obtaining transform DKCU ,c that satisfies the following equation:
|ek,y,d,dk〉= DKCU ,c |ek,y,d,0〉 , (1)
where |0〉 (a basis state consisting of a sequence of zeros) serve as some auxiliary qubits in workspace.
It can be seen from related work on QOTP-based QHE that a critical barrier on the route to an efficient and perfectly secure
quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme is caused by the non-Clifford T gate, which, however, is an indispensable
ingredient of universal gate set. To homomorphically perform a T gate on the server, a phase correction depending on the
encryption key has to be applied, whereas the key cannot be revealed to the server. To overcome this obstacle, some schemes
introduce a round of communication conveying some evaluated information determined by the encryption key between the
client and the server,6, 8, 9 whereas others resort to classical Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).11, 12
By contrast, Eq. (1) implies that homomorphically performing a Clifford circuit (not involving any T gate) could become
more convenient by the use of quantum parallelism. Before we present this, we conclude a relationship between an arbitrary
Clifford circuit C and its corresponding key update process in Lemma 1, which is the premise of our quantum homomorphic
evaluation protocol for Clifford circuits in Section 4.
Lemma 1. Suppose C is a Clifford circuit; then, the key update process corresponding to C can also be implemented with a
Clifford circuit and be executed by the server ahead of the homomorphic evaluation of C .
Proof. The key update operations for gates except T involve only bit exchange and addition modular 2, which can be
implemented with CNOT gates, meaning that no T gate is needed. Additionally, since the homomorphic evaluation for a
Clifford circuit does not require any classical secret parameter, the key update process for C only depends on the sequence of
gates in C ; hence, the decryption-key-obtaining transform for C merely takes the encryption key and |0〉 as inputs and outputs
the corresponding decryption key, i.e.
|ek,dk〉= DKC |ek,0〉 . (2)
As a result, applying DKC on an equally weighted superposition state leads to a superposition of all possible encryption and
decryption key pairs, which can surely be executed before the homomorphic evaluation on the encrypted state.
According to Lemma 1, the server Bob can prepare a superposition state of n qubits on his own, perform DKC on it and
then return the result to the client Alice. If Alice takes a measurement on the encryption key part of the result, she randomly
picks out an encryption and decryption key pair, with which she can encrypt and decrypt her data. However, the security holds
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only if Bob honestly performs DKC on the superposition state of all possible encryption keys and does not measure the resultant
state before Alice does, or Alice can detect Bob’s cheating, both of which are hard to achieve. To solve this problem, Alice can
first choose an encryption key and then let another server Dave search out the corresponding key pair from the resultant state
for her. If Bob and Dave do not know each other and do those similar tasks for a large number of clients, they cannot work
together to recover the initial data.
Quantum search on encrypted data
Since the Grover’s algorithm excepting the final measurement is a unitary transform, one can certainly apply it homomorphically
on a ciphered superposition state and obtain the encrypted search result by the use of QHE. Here, we consider the situation that
Alice wants Bob to search on her encrypted superposition state (which could be obtained by a QRAM addressing scheme14)
and then return the ciphered result to her but does not care how he carries out the operations exactly. In other words, Alice
prefers to prepare the inputs of the search and handles the evaluated search result rather than participate in the entire process of
the evaluation. This requirement is reasonable in the sense that it coincides with the relationship between the client and the
server in cloud computing, which is a prevalent paradigm nowadays.
It is known that the Grover’s search is made up of a sequence of repeated Grover iterations, and each iteration contains an
oracle that has the ability to mark items satisfying a specific search condition. For NP problems, solutions can be recognized in
polynomial time; this means each Grover iteration can be constructed with polynomial elementary gates. Suppose the search
space has M = 2m items; then, there may be O(
√
M · poly(m)) T gates within the search circuit in the worst case (when each
Grover iteration contains polynomial T gates), which is beyond the capability of HE-based QHE schemes. A dilemma seems to
appear, i.e. the key shall neither be updated homomorphically (with classical HE) by Bob11, 12 nor be renewed interactively
by Alice. As a way out of this impasse, we introduce a third party—a trusted key center, Carol—between Alice and Bob, to
undertake the interactive key update work.
Outsourcing key update to a trusted key center
As mentioned above, there are four modules in QHE—key generation, encryption, decryption and homomorphic evaluation,
where key generation includes randomly choosing a classical encryption key and calculating the decryption key with the key
update algorithm, which becomes long and tedious if there are a large number of T gates in the homomorphic evaluation. To
ease the burden of Alice and keep the homomorphic search going successfully, we let a trusted key center Carol negotiate a
random encryption key with Alice and then calculate the corresponding decryption key by communicating with Bob. That is,
we divide the client in the interactive QHE scheme9 into two parts: a thin client (Alice) and a trusted key center (Carol). The
requirements and constraints on Carol are given in Constraint 1.
Constraint 1 (Requirements and constraints on the key center). The key Center Carol obeys the following two constraints:
1. Carol is a classical computer augmented with the ability to prepare qubits from four candidate quantum states:
|+〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉= 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉), ∣∣+y〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉), ∣∣−y〉= 1√
2
(|0〉− i |1〉) (3)
which serve as auxiliary qubits for T gates in homomorphic evaluations as well as the encodings of random bits in quantum key
distribution (QKD).
2. Carol honestly obeys the subsequent search protocol and would not reveal the decryption key to others. After returning the
decryption key to Alice, she destroys the related data on her side immediately.
Thus, our blind search protocol runs among Alice (the client), Bob (the search server) and Carol (the trusted key center)
as illustrated in Fig. 1, where key generation is split into three parts: Alice negotiates an encryption key with Carol, Carol
calculates the corresponding decryption key using the key update algorithm, and Carol securely returns the decryption key
back to Alice. With the help of QKD and OTP, these tasks can be accomplished with perfect security. Moreover, since the key
update operations are classical, Carol could be a classical computer augmented with the ability to prepare only four quantum
states listed in Constraint 1, and Alice only needs to perform Pauli operators {X , Z} and classical bitwise additions (modular 2)
for encryption and decryption before and after the homomorphic search.
A blind search protocol with a key center
With the assistance of the key center, an interactive protocol for quantum search on encrypted data is illustrated in Protocol 1,
and the schematic circuit implementing this protocol is depicted in Fig. 2, in which the homomorphic T circuits (T gadgets)
are the same as that of Fisher’s scheme.8 To make our circuit more comprehensible, we rephrase the jth T gadget in the lth G
iteration on the gth wire in Fig. 3, where
∣∣ψg〉 is the gth qubit of the plain state |ψ〉 and Z zˆX xˆ ∣∣ψg〉 is the encrypted qubit of ∣∣ψg〉
just before the application of this T gadget.
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Figure 1. Tasks of each party and interactions among parties. First, Alice negotiates an encryption key for her data with Carol.
Then, Alice encrypts her superposed data with this encryption key and sends the encrypted state to Bob. Once Carol receives
the encryption key and Bob receives the encrypted data, the homomorphic search and the key update process begin and proceed
synchronously. During the homomorphic search, Carol sends some auxiliary data to Bob and then receives some related
measurement results (from Bob), which are needed for key refresh. When Bob finishes the homomorphic search and obtains an
encrypted solution, Carol finishes the key update process and gets a corresponding decryption key as well. After that, Alice
receives the encrypted search result from Bob and the decryption key from Carol. Finally, Alice decrypts the ciphered search
result with the decryption key and obtains a plain result.
Protocol 1. Blind Quantum search on encrypted data
1. Alice sends a number n—the length of her encrypted state—to Carol.
2. Carol shares a binary string of 3n random bits with Alice by the BB84 protocol,15 where |+〉 , ∣∣+y〉 stands for 0, and
|−〉 , ∣∣−y〉 stands for 1. The first 2n bits of the binary string act as ek and the remaining n bits act as the encryption key sk for dk.
3. Alice encrypts her plain state |ψ〉= 1√
M ∑
M
j=0 | j,data( j)〉 with ek = (x0,z0) and sends the encrypted state
Encek |ψ〉= 1√
M
[I⊗m⊗ (⊗nk=1Zz0(k)Xx0(k))]
M
∑
j=0
| j,data( j)〉
to Bob. Here, the item index j within |ψ〉 is not encrypted.
4. Bob searches on Encek |ψ〉 homomorphically with hGrv, and Carol updates the key synchronously. During the search,
once a T gate appears, Bob asks Carol to send an auxiliary qubit from {|+〉 , |−〉 , ∣∣+y〉 , ∣∣−y〉} along with a related evaluating
key bit (wl( j) in Fig. 3) to him and then performs the T gadget with those data. After that, he returns a one-bit measurement
result (cl( j) in Fig. 3) to Carol for key update.
5. When the homomorphic search is completed, Bob measures the search result hGrv(Encek |ψ〉) and returns the (encrypted)
classical outcomeM [hGrv(Encek |ψ〉)] to Alice. Meanwhile, Carol finishes the key update process and obtains the decryption
key dk for ek and hGrv; she then encrypts dk with sk by classical OTP and sends it to Alice.
6. Alice first recovers dk with sk and then decrypts M [hGrv(Encek |ψ〉)] with dk and obtains the classical search result.
After that, she can check this result with her search condition and decide whether Bob honestly performed the homomorphic
quantum search.
In Fig. 2, Carol gives |auxl〉 = Pyl ,dl ⊗sj=1 H |0〉 and wl to Bob for the lth G iteration, and Bob then returns the s-bit
measurement result cl from this iteration to Carol, which is used to update the key. More precisely, as illustrated in Fig. 3, the
jth qubit of |auxl〉 and the jth bit of wl (or wl( j)) together with an encrypted qubit Z zˆ′X xˆ′ |ψg〉 under key (xˆ, zˆ)(xˆ, zˆ ∈ {0,1})
act as the input of the jth T gadget in the lth G iteration. This T gadget then outputs a one-bit measurement outcome
cl( j) and an encrypted result of T |ψg〉 under a refreshed key (xˆ′, zˆ′)(xˆ′, zˆ′ ∈ {0,1}), which satisfies xˆ′ = xˆ⊕ cl( j) and
zˆ′ = xˆ[cl( j)⊕ yl( j)⊕1]⊕ zˆ⊕ dl( j)⊕ yl( j). The classical decryption (performing a bitwise addition between the encrypted
search result and the decryption key) after the quantum measurement is omitted in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. Schematic circuit implementing Protocol 1. There are t = O(
√
M) G iterations in the circuit, which carries out the
homomorphic search transform denoted by hGrv. A G iteration is a homomorphic version of the normal Grover iteration in the
Grover’s algorithm, which is obtained by replacing every T gate in the normal Grover iteration with the T gadget illustrated in
Fig. 3. Suppose there are s T gadgets in each G iteration; then, the lth G iteration (l ∈ [1, t]) needs an auxiliary state |auxl〉 of s
qubits and an evaluation key wl of 2s bits to perform s S corrections (or P corrections in Ref. 8) within this G iteration.
Pyl ,dl ≡⊗sj=1Pyl( j),dl( j) is the phase transform for the lth G iteration, where yl and dl are s-bit binary strings randomly chosen by
Carol for all T gadgets in the lth G iteration, and Pyl( j),dl( j) ≡ Zdl( j)Syl( j) is the phase transform for the jth T gadget in the lth G
iteration. Applying Pyl( j),dl( j) on |+〉 gives the jth qubit of |auxl〉, which is |+〉 , |−〉 ,
∣∣+y〉 or ∣∣−y〉. wl is the Boolean XOR
result between some intermediate key bits and yl ; cl is the measurement result of s bits from the lth G iteration. yl ,dl and cl are
all involved in the key update process for the lth G iteration.
Figure 3. The T gadget within the schematic circuit.
Simulation of two-qubit blind search
To verify the effectiveness of our blind quantum search scheme, we present the detailed circuit for two-qubit blind search in
Fig. 6 and simulate its process with MATLAB. The detailed simulation code is included in Appendix B, which always outputs
the expected search target as we expected.
Without loss of generality, suppose Alice wants to find out the item 10 from the set {00, 01, 10, 11}; thus, a single Grover
iteration is enough, and the oracle within the iteration can be built with X and Toffoli gates as illustrated in Fig. 4.16 After
decomposing the Toffoli gate into the universal gates supporting homomorphic evaluations (i.e. X ,Z,H,S,CNOT,T ), a detailed
quantum circuit for two-qubit plaintext search can be obtained as dipicted in Fig. 5. To perform a two-qubit ciphertext search,
this normal Grover’s search circuit has to be transformed into its homomorphic version, which can be achieved by replacing
each T gate (or T † gate) in Fig. 5 with a T gadget (or T † gadget). A T † gadget is obtained by replacing each S gate in Fig. 3
with an S† gate, and the key update rule for a T † gadget is the same as that for a T gadget.
With QOTP encryption and OTP decryption being included, the resultant blind quantum search circuit for two-qubit states
is presented in Appendix A. The input of this circuit is the superposed plain state |ψ〉 = 12 (|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉) along
with the oracle qubit |−〉, and its output should be the classical search target together with the unchanged oracle qubit.
In outline, the simulation proceeds in six steps provided below, which include the operations carried out by three parties
(the client, the key center and the search server):
1. Randomly generate a four-bit encryption key ek = (x0,z0) for |ψ〉.
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Figure 4. The oracle for finding 10 from {00, 01, 10, 11}.
Figure 5. The two-qubit Grover’s search circuit.
2. Randomly generate a 14-bit evaluation key evk = (y1,d1) for seven T gadgets in Fig. 6.
3. Encrypt |ψ〉 |−〉 with ek by QOTP. The encrypted result acts as the input state encState of the quantum homomorphic
search.
4. Perform the homomorphic Grover’s search circuit on encState and obtain the encrypted output state. Meanwhile,
refresh the intermediate key with the key update algorithm.
5. Measure the encrypted output state; update the intermediate key and then get a two-bit decryption key dk.
6. Decrypt the output ciphertext with dk by OTP and then get a plain search result.
The simulation indicates that with different encryption keys (denoted by ek = (x0,z0)), evaluation keys (evk = (y1,d1))
and intermediate measurement results (c1), one may get different decryption keys (dk) and encrypted search results, but the
decrypted outcome is always 10—the search target that we predetermined at the beginning of this section. Here, we list some
representative outcomes in Table 2, where the last bit of x0 and the last bit of z0 stay 0 since the oracle qubit does not need to be
encrypted.
Plain
state
ek evk c1 Encrypted
result
dk Decrypted
result
|+〉 |+〉
x0 = 100
z0 = 110
y1 = 1010110
d1 = 0111001
1110111 01 11
10x0 = 100
z0 = 010
y1 = 1110011
d1 = 1011010
1000010 00 10
x0 = 100
z0 = 100
y1 = 0100001
d1 = 0000101
0000101 01 11
x0 = 010
z0 = 110
y1 = 0000011
d1 = 0111110
1001101 11 01
x0 = 110
z0 = 110
y1 = 0101100
d1 = 0001010
1011101 10 00
Table 2. Outcomes of the simulation.
A compact quantum homomorphic evaluation protocol for Clifford circuits
In this section, we demonstrate a non-interactive homomorphic evaluation protocol based on quantum parallelism for Clifford
circuits, whose main idea is stated in Lemma 1. The key update process here is different from the CL scheme proposed by
Broadbent:11 Alice lets the evaluator Bob perform the key update transform quantumly on the superposition of all possible
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encryption keys rather than homomorphically on the encrypted true key (by classical HE). She then randomly chooses another
quantum server Dave as her key searcher and asks Dave to search out the required encryption and decryption key pair for her.
The detailed procedure is presented as follows.
Protocol 2. quantum homomorphic evaluation for a Clifford circuit C .
1. Alice chooses a 2n-bit encryption key ek.
2. Alice encrypts her plain superposition state |ψ〉 = 1√
M ∑
M
j=0 | j,data( j)〉 with ek and then sends the encrypted state
Encek |ψ〉= 1√M [I⊗m⊗ (⊗nk=0Zz0(k)Xx0(k))]∑
M
j=0 | j,data( j)〉 and a number n to Bob.
3. Bob prepares an equally weighted 2n-qubit superposition state |κ〉= 12n ∑2
2n−1
j=0 | j〉, which involves all possible encryption
keys.
4. Bob applies C on Encek |ψ〉 and simultaneously performs the key update transform DKC defined in Eq. (2) on |κ〉
accordingly. After that, he returns the evaluation result UC (Encek |ψ〉) together with the superposition of encryption and
decryption key pairs |κ ′〉= 12n ∑2
2n−1
j=0 | j,DecKey( j)〉 to Alice.
5. Alice randomly chooses another quantum server Dave as her key searcher.
6. Alice sends |κ ′〉 and ek to Dave and asks him to search out an item whose first 2n qubits equal ek from |κ ′〉.
7. Dave first performs the Grover’s algorithm on |κ ′〉, measures the result and then returns the outcome (ek,dk) to Alice
securely with the BB84 protocol.
8. Alice decrypts UC (Encek |ψ〉) with dk and gets UC |ψ〉.
Security and performance
Our two protocols are based on perfectly secure QHE (or secure delegated QC);6, 8, 9 they can retain security if extra steps they
take and extra data they reveal with respect to the basic QHE do not cause any damage.
In Protocol 1, the extra data include the quantumly encoded ek and sk, the encrypted dk under sk and the encrypted search
result under dk. The encryption key ek and the secret key sk are perfectly protected from any eavesdropper by the BB84
protocol, and the decryption key dk is perfectly concealed by OTP. As for the search result, it is encrypted by QOTP before
measurement, and becomes an OTP ciphertext after measurement.
In Protocol 2, a public input length n in step 2 does not reveal extra information since it can also be obtained by Bob when
he later performs a homomorphic evaluation with the encrypted input he received from Alice. In step 5, Alice randomly chooses
a key searcher Dave, which ensures that although Dave has the key and Bob has the encrypted data, they do not know each
other and would not exchange their data to decrypt the ciphered outcome and obtain the plain search result.
In both protocols, the client Alice only needs to encrypt her plain data with QOTP before the homomorphic evaluation and
decrypt the ciphered result with OTP after the evaluation, which is linear in the size of the input. Furthermore, the computational
complexity of a homomorphic evaluation executed by the server Bob is the same as that of the non-homomorphic version. In
Protocol 1, the communication complexity between Carol and Bob is in proportion to the evaluation complexity on the server,
which is the same as that of the delegated quantum computing. In Protocol 2, the search complexity for the key pair on the
key searcher is sub-exponential in the size of the encryption key space or the size of the input space of the evaluation. Thus,
Protocol 2 is especially suitable for a long evaluation with a short input, since the decryption time (including searching the
decryption key) is independent of the length of the evaluating circuit but depends on the length of the circuit’s input.
For a short input, Protocol 2 is perfectly secure and compact, which is unique among related works. To see this, we give
a comparison between our protocols and other closely related schemes in Table 3, in which the former seven proposals are
applicable for circuits containing T gates and the latter two are designed for circuits without any T gate. The abbreviations QC
and q-IND-CPA is short for quantum computing (or quantum computation) and indistinguishability under chosen plaintext
attack by quantum polynomial-time adversary.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a blind quantum search protocol on encrypted superposition states based on QHE. To homomorphically
perform the Grover’s algorithm successfully and maintain perfect security, we rule out the QHE schemes utilizing classical HE.
Instead, a trusted key center is introduced to communicate with the search server and update the key, which greatly alleviates the
client’s workload, for the client does not need to participate in the evaluation. This idea is not only applicable to blind quantum
search but also adapted to delegated quantum computing wherein the computing purpose is easy to describe but the computing
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Schemes Security Compactness Interaction during evaluation
Liang’s scheme6 perfect uncompact two-way quantum interaction
QC on
encrypted data8
perfect uncompact two-way classical interaction &
one-way quantum interaction
Delegating
private QC9
perfect uncompact two-way classical interaction &
one-way quantum interaction
EPR11 q-IND-CPA R2-quasi-
compact
non-interactive
AUX11 q-IND-CPA compact non-interactive
TP12 q-IND-CPA compact non-interactive
Protocol 1 perfect uncompact two-way classical interaction &
one-way quantum interaction
CL11 q-IND-CPA compact non-interactive
Protocol 2 perfect compact non-interactive
Table 3. Comparison with related work.
process is long and complex. Aside from this interactive protocol for numerous T gates, we also provide a non-interactive QHE
protocol for Clifford circuits, which is both secure and compact. These two protocols are useful for different situations and
enable the server to update the evaluating circuits or computing strategies independent of the client.
Although our two protocols deal with data encrypted by QOTP, they can be conveniently modified to handle data encrypted
by another quantum encryption scheme QE as long as the commutation rules for the encryption/decryption transform of QE
and a universal gate set G ′ be found. In this case, one just needs to construct a homomorphic search circuit (or evaluation
circuit) with homomorphic circuits for gates from G ′ and adjust the key update algorithm accordingly.
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Appendix A: The quantum blind search circuit for two-qubit encrypted states
Figure 6. The quantum blind search circuit for two-qubit encrypted states. The circuit can be divided into 24 steps (plus
quantum encryption and classical decryption); each step corresponds to a round of key refresh. There are seven T (or T †)
gadgets, each of which is marked by a shadowed area. The two-qubit input is encrypted with four key bits — x0(1),x0(2),z0(1)
and z0(2), and the oracle qubit |−〉 can be thought of as being encrypted with key bits x0(3) = z0(3) = 0.
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Appendix B: The MATLAB code for simulation
The main code that performs the circuit in Fig. 6 is provided as below, where the function TGadget(...) is called to perform a T
or T † gadget.
1 I = eye(2);%defined the related unitary transform
2 H = sym([1/2^(1/2),1/2^(1/2);1/2^(1/2),- 1/2^(1/2)]);
3 X = sym([0,1;1,0]);Z = sym([1,0;0,-1]);S = sym([1,0;0,1i]);
4 S_adjoint = transpose(conj(S));
5 CNOT = sym([1,0,0,0;0,1,0,0;0,0,0,1;0,0,1,0;]);
6 %CNOT with 3 qubits involved,the 3rd qubit act as target,the 1st qubit act as control
7 CNOT_13 = sym(blkdiag(eye(4),X,X));
8 CNOT_31 = sym(zeros(8,8));
9 for j = 1 : 2 : 7
10 CNOT_31(j,j) = sym(1);
11 end
12 for j = 2 : 2 : 4
13 CNOT_31(j,j + 4) = sym(1);
14 end
15 for j = 6 : 2 : 8
16 CNOT_31(j,j - 4) = sym(1);
17 end
18 %the 4th qubit act as control,the 1st qubit act as target
19 CNOT_41 = sym(zeros(16,16));
20 for j = 1 : 2 : 15
21 CNOT_41(j,j) = sym(1);
22 end
23 for j = 2 : 2 : 8
24 CNOT_41(j,j + 8) = sym(1);
25 end
26 for j = 10 : 2 : 16
27 CNOT_41(j,j - 8) = sym(1);
28 end
29 dataQubits = sym([1/2;1/2;1/2;1/2]);%set the input state
30 oracleQubit = sym([1/sqrt(2);-1/sqrt(2)]);
31 plainState = kron(dataQubits,oracleQubit);
32 %randomly generate a 4-bit encryption key, the 1st row is x0,the 2nd is z0
33 encKeyBits_forDataQubits = randi([0,1],[2,2]);
34 %the encrytion key for oracle qubit is 0,0 or unencrypted
35 encKeyBits = [encKeyBits_forDataQubits,[0;0]];
36 disp('the random encryption key:');disp(encKeyBits);
37 %randomly generate a 14-bit evaluation key, the 1st row is y1, the 2nd row is d1
38 evalKeyBits = randi([0,1],[2,7]);
39 disp('the random evaluation key:');disp(evalKeyBits);
40 encState = kron(kron(Z^encKeyBits(2,1) * X^encKeyBits(1,1),Z^encKeyBits(2,2) * ...
X^encKeyBits(1,2)),Z^encKeyBits(2,3) * X^encKeyBits(1,3)) * plainState;%encrypt
41 %%%%% perform the homomorphic search %%%%%
42 curKeyBits = encKeyBits;
43 disp('=== step 1 ===');% perform step 1
44 curState = kron(kron(I,X),H) * encState;
45 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
46 curKeyBits(1,3) = lastStepKeyBits(2,3);%update key
47 curKeyBits(2,3) = lastStepKeyBits(1,3);
48 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
49 disp('=== step 2 ===');% perform step 2
50 curState = kron(I,CNOT) * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
51 curKeyBits(2,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,2),lastStepKeyBits(2,3));
52 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,2),lastStepKeyBits(1,3));
53 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
54 disp('=== step 3, adjoint T gadget on the 3rd qubit ===');
55 auxQubit = Z^evalKeyBits(2,1) * S_adjoint^evalKeyBits(1,1) * H * sym([1;0]);
56 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,3),evalKeyBits(1,1));
57 [c,curState] = TGadget(1,3,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
58 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;%update key
59 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,3),c);
60 curKeyBits(2,3) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,3)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,1) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,3) + evalKeyBits(2,1) + evalKeyBits(1,1) , 2);
61 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
62 disp('=== step 4 ===');
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63 curState = CNOT_13 * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
64 curKeyBits(2,1) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,1),lastStepKeyBits(2,3));
65 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,1),lastStepKeyBits(1,3));
66 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
67 disp('=== step 5, T gadget on the 3rd qubit ===');
68 auxQubit = Z^evalKeyBits(2,2)*S^evalKeyBits(1,2)*H*sym([1;0]);
69 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,3),evalKeyBits(1,2));
70 [c,curState] = TGadget(0,3,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
71 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
72 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,3),c);
73 curKeyBits(2,3) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,3)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,2) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,3) + evalKeyBits(2,2) + evalKeyBits(1,2) , 2);
74 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
75 disp('=== step 6 ===');
76 curState = kron(I,CNOT) * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
77 curKeyBits(2,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,2),lastStepKeyBits(2,3));
78 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,2),lastStepKeyBits(1,3));
79 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
80 disp('=== step 7, adjoint T gadget on the 3rd qubit ===');
81 auxQubit = Z^evalKeyBits(2,3) * S_adjoint^evalKeyBits(1,3) * H * sym([1;0]);
82 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,3),evalKeyBits(1,3));
83 [c,curState] = TGadget(1,3,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
84 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
85 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,3),c);
86 curKeyBits(2,3) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,3)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,3) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,3) + evalKeyBits(2,3) + evalKeyBits(1,3) , 2);
87 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
88 disp('=== step 8 ===');
89 curState = CNOT_13 * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
90 curKeyBits(2,1) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,1),lastStepKeyBits(2,3));
91 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,1),lastStepKeyBits(1,3));
92 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
93 disp('=== step 9, T gadget on the 3rd qubit ===');
94 auxQubit=Z^evalKeyBits(2,4)*S^evalKeyBits(1,4)*H*sym([1;0]);
95 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,3),evalKeyBits(1,4));
96 [c,curState] = TGadget(0,3,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
97 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
98 curKeyBits(1,3) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,3),c);
99 curKeyBits(2,3) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,3)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,4) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,3) + evalKeyBits(2,4) + evalKeyBits(1,4) , 2);
100 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
101 disp('=== step 10, adjoint T gadget on the 2nd qubit ===');
102 auxQubit = Z^evalKeyBits(2,5) * S_adjoint^evalKeyBits(1,5) * H * sym([1;0]);
103 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,2),evalKeyBits(1,5));
104 [c,curState] = TGadget(1,2,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
105 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
106 curKeyBits(1,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,2),c);
107 curKeyBits(2,2) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,2)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,5) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,2) + evalKeyBits(2,5) + evalKeyBits(1,5) , 2);
108 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
109 disp('=== step 11 ===');
110 curState = kron(CNOT,I) * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
111 curKeyBits(2,1) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,1),lastStepKeyBits(2,2));
112 curKeyBits(1,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,1),lastStepKeyBits(1,2));
113 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
114 disp('=== step 12, adjoint T gadget on the 2nd qubit ===');
115 auxQubit = Z^evalKeyBits(2,6) * S_adjoint^evalKeyBits(1,6) * H * sym([1;0]);
116 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,2),evalKeyBits(1,6));
117 [c,curState] = TGadget(1,2,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
118 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
119 curKeyBits(1,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,2),c);
120 curKeyBits(2,2) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,2)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,6) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,2) + evalKeyBits(2,6) + evalKeyBits(1,6) , 2);
121 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
122 disp('=== step 13 ===');
123 curState = kron(CNOT,I) * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
124 curKeyBits(2,1) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,1),lastStepKeyBits(2,2));
125 curKeyBits(1,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,1),lastStepKeyBits(1,2));
126 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
127 disp('=== step 14, T gadget on the 1st qubit ===');
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128 auxQubit=Z^evalKeyBits(2,7)*S^evalKeyBits(1,7)*H*sym([1;0]);
129 auxBit = xor(curKeyBits(1,1),evalKeyBits(1,7));
130 [c,curState] = TGadget(0,1,curState,auxQubit,auxBit);
131 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
132 curKeyBits(1,1) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,1),c);
133 curKeyBits(2,1) = mod(lastStepKeyBits(1,1)*(mod(c + evalKeyBits(1,7) + 1,2)) + ...
lastStepKeyBits(2,1) + evalKeyBits(2,7) + evalKeyBits(1,7) , 2);
134 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
135 disp('=== step 15 ===');
136 curState=kron(I,kron(S,H))*curState;lastStepKeyBits=curKeyBits;
137 curKeyBits(2,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,2),lastStepKeyBits(2,2));
138 curKeyBits(1,3) = lastStepKeyBits(2,3);
139 curKeyBits(2,3) = lastStepKeyBits(1,3);
140 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
141 disp('=== step 16 ===');curState=kron(kron(I,X),I)*curState;
142 disp('=== step 17 ===');
143 curState = kron(kron(H,H),I) * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
144 curKeyBits(1,1) = lastStepKeyBits(2,1);curKeyBits(2,1) = lastStepKeyBits(1,1);
145 curKeyBits(1,2) = lastStepKeyBits(2,2);curKeyBits(2,2) = lastStepKeyBits(1,2);
146 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
147 disp('=== step 18 ===');curState = kron(kron(X,X),I)*curState;
148 disp('=== step 19 ===');curState = kron(kron(I,H),I)*curState;
149 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
150 curKeyBits(1,2) = lastStepKeyBits(2,2);
151 curKeyBits(2,2) = lastStepKeyBits(1,2);
152 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
153 disp('=== step 20 ===');
154 curState = kron(CNOT,I) * curState; lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
155 curKeyBits(2,1) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(2,1),lastStepKeyBits(2,2));
156 curKeyBits(1,2) = xor(lastStepKeyBits(1,1),lastStepKeyBits(1,2));
157 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
158 disp('=== step 21 ===');curState = kron(kron(I,H),I) * curState;
159 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
160 curKeyBits(1,2) = lastStepKeyBits(2,2);
161 curKeyBits(2,2) = lastStepKeyBits(1,2);
162 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
163 disp('=== step 22 ===');curState = kron(kron(X,X),I) * curState;
164 disp('=== step 23 ===');curState = kron(kron(H,H),I) * curState;
165 lastStepKeyBits = curKeyBits;
166 curKeyBits(1,1) = lastStepKeyBits(2,1);curKeyBits(2,1) = lastStepKeyBits(1,1);
167 curKeyBits(1,2) = lastStepKeyBits(2,2);curKeyBits(2,2) = lastStepKeyBits(1,2);
168 disp('the updated key:');disp(curKeyBits);
169 disp('=== step 24: measure the first 2 qubits ===');
170 dispStr = '';%for display
171 alphabet = [0,1,2,3];%the possible measurement outcomes
172 probs = [0,0,0,0];%the possibility of each measurement outcome
173 for k = 1 : 8 %traverse each amplitude of the transformed outcome
174 %only consider the components with non-zero amplitude
175 if(curState(k,1) 6= 0)
176 %current basis state,3 bit binary string
177 curBaseState = dec2bin(k - 1,3);
178 if(strcmp(dispStr,'') == 1)
179 dispStr = strcat('(',char(curState(k,1)), ')*|' ,curBaseState,'>');
180 else
181 dispStr = strcat(dispStr,' + (',char(curState(k,1)),')*|',curBaseState,'>');
182 end
183 %add the square of the amplitude to probs
184 curQubitsValue_toMeasure = bin2dec(curBaseState(1:2));
185 probs(1,curQubitsValue_toMeasure + 1) = probs(1,curQubitsValue_toMeasure + 1) + ...
double(abs(curState(k,1).^2));
186 end
187 end
188 disp(strcat('the encrypted search result:',dispStr));
189 measuredResult = randsrc(1,1,[alphabet;probs]);%measure
190 disp(strcat('the measurement outcome of the first 2 qubits:',dec2bin(measuredResult,2)));
191 %decrypt
192 decKeyBits = curKeyBits(1,1:2);%get decryption key
193 decKeyValue = decKeyBits(1,1)*2 + decKeyBits(1,2);
194 disp('the decryption key:');disp(decKeyBits);
195 searchResult = bitxor(measuredResult,decKeyValue);
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196 disp(strcat('the homomorphic Grover search result(decrypted):',dec2bin(searchResult)));
The following list is the code of the function TGadget(...).
1 function [measuredResult,transFormedState] = TGadget(adjointFlag,tPos,encState,auxQubit,auxBit)
2 %apply the T or adjoint T gadget on the tPos^{th} qubit of encState(3-qubit), output the ...
transformed result of encState and measuredResult
3 %@param adjointFlag: if it equals 1, perform the adjoint T gadeget; if it equals 0, perform the ...
T gadget.
4 %@param tPos: an integer equals 0,1 or 2; auxQubit: an auxiliary qubit for T gadget
5 %@param auxBit: an auxiliary bit for T gadget, it decides whether perform the S or adjoint S ...
correction
6 I = eye(2);%defined the related unitary transform
7 S = sym([1,0;0,1i]); S_adjoint = transpose(conj(S));
8 T = sym([1,0;0,exp(1i * pi / 4)]); T_adjoint = transpose(conj(T));
9 %the second qubit act as control,the first qubit act as target
10 CNOT_21 = sym([1,0,0,0;0,0,0,1;0,0,1,0;0,1,0,0]);
11 CNOT_31 = sym(zeros(8,8));
12 for j = 1 : 2 : 7
13 CNOT_31(j,j) = sym(1);
14 end
15 for j = 2 : 2 : 4
16 CNOT_31(j,j + 4) = sym(1);
17 end
18 for j = 6 : 2 : 8 CNOT_31(j,j - 4) = sym(1); end
19 CNOT_41 = sym(zeros(16,16));
20 for j = 1 : 2 : 15 CNOT_41(j,j) = sym(1); end
21 for j = 2 : 2 : 8 CNOT_41(j,j + 8) = sym(1); end
22 for j = 10 : 2 : 16 CNOT_41(j,j - 8) = sym(1); end
23 %the input state include a 3-qubit cipher state with an auxiliary qubit
24 inputState = kron(encState,auxQubit);%a 16*1 column vector
25 if(adjointFlag == 0)
26 Tgate = T;Sgate = S;
27 elseif(adjointFlag == 1)
28 Tgate = T_adjoint;Sgate = S_adjoint;
29 end
30 if(tPos == 1)%perform the unitary transform in T gadget
31 intermedState = kron(eye(8),Sgate^auxBit) * CNOT_41 * kron(Tgate,eye(8)) * inputState;
32 elseif(tPos == 2)
33 intermedState = kron(eye(8),Sgate^auxBit) * kron(I,CNOT_31) * ...
kron(kron(I,Tgate),eye(4))*inputState;
34 elseif(tPos == 3)
35 intermedState = kron(eye(8),Sgate^auxBit) * kron(eye(4),CNOT_21) * ...
kron(kron(eye(4),Tgate),I) * inputState;
36 end
37 %measure the tPot^{th} qubit
38 dispStr = '';%for display
39 alphabet = [0,1];%the possible measurement outcomes
40 probs = [0,0];%the possibility of each measurement outcome
41 for k = 1 : 16 %traverse each amplitude of the transformed outcome
42 if(intermedState(k,1) 6= 0)
43 %current basis state,4 bit binary string
44 curBaseState = dec2bin(k - 1,4);
45 if(strcmp(dispStr,'') == 1)
46 dispStr = strcat('(',char(intermedState(k,1)),') * |',curBaseState,'>');
47 else
48 dispStr = strcat(dispStr,' + (',char(intermedState(k,1)),') * |',curBaseState,'>');
49 end
50 %add the square of the amplitude to probs
51 curQubitValue_toMeasure = bin2dec(curBaseState(tPos));
52 probs(1,curQubitValue_toMeasure + 1) = probs(1,curQubitValue_toMeasure + 1) + ...
double(abs(intermedState(k,1).^2));
53 end
54 end
55 disp(strcat('the tansformed outcome before measure: ',dispStr));
56 measuredResult = randsrc(1,1,[alphabet;probs]);%measure,0 or 1
57 disp(strcat('measure the qubit on position ',int2str(tPos),' gives:',int2str(measuredResult)));
58 collapsedState = sym(zeros(8,1));%collapse
59 for k = 1 : 16
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60 if(intermedState(k,1) 6= 0)
61 curBaseState = dec2bin(k - 1,4);
62 if(strcmp(curBaseState(tPos),int2str(measuredResult))==1)
63 %remained component after measurement
64 %replace the measured qubit by the auxiliary qubit
65 curBaseState(tPos) = curBaseState(4);
66 curValueStr = strcat(curBaseState(1),curBaseState(2),curBaseState(3));
67 collapsedState(bin2dec(curValueStr) + 1,1) = intermedState(k,1);
68 end
69 end
70 end%normalization
71 collapsedStateNorm = sqrt(sum(abs(collapsedState).^2));
72 transFormedState = collapsedState./collapsedStateNorm;
73 disp('normalized result state after measurement:');
74 disp(transFormedState);
75 end
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